Full Text of Blix Report to UN - 08 March 2003
Introduction
This is the full text of Dr Hans Blix's statement to the UN
Security Council in New York, on 08 March 2003.
Mr President(of the UN), For nearly three years, I have been coming to the Security
Council presenting the quarterly reports of UNMOVIC. They have described our
many preparations for the resumption of inspections in Iraq.
The 12th quarterly report is the first that describes three months of
inspections. They come after four years without inspections. The report was
finalised 10 days ago and a number of relevant events have taken place since
then.
Today's statement will supplement the circulated report on these points to
bring the council up-to-date.
Part 1:Inspection process:
Inspections in Iraq resumed on 27 November 2002. In matters relating to
process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few
difficulties and certainly much less than those that were faced by UNSCOM in
the period 1991 to 1998. This may well be due to the strong outside pressure.
Some practical matters, which were not settled by the talks Dr ElBaradei
and I had with the Iraqi side in Vienna prior to inspections or in resolution
1441 (2002), have been resolved at meetings, which we have had in Baghdad.
Initial difficulties raised by the Iraqi side about helicopters and aerial
surveillance planes operating in the no-fly zones were overcome.
This is not to say that the operation of inspections is free from
frictions, but at this juncture we are able to perform professional no-notice
inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance.
American U-2 and French Mirage surveillance aircraft already give us
valuable imagery, supplementing satellite pictures and we would expect soon to be able to add night vision capability through an aircraft offered to us by the Russian Federation.
We also expect to add low-level, close area surveillance through drones
provided by Germany. We are grateful not only to the countries, which place
these valuable tools at our disposal, but also to the states, most recently Cyprus, which has agreed to the stationing of aircraft on their territory.
Part 2: Documents and Interviews:
Iraq, with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to
provide more documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons programmes.
Only a few new such documents have come to light so far and been handed
over since we began inspections. It was a disappointment that Iraq's
Declaration of 7 December did not bring new documentary evidence.
I hope that efforts in this respect, including the appointment of a
governmental commission, will give significant results.
When proscribed items are deemed unaccounted for it is above all credible
accounts that is needed - or the proscribed items, if they exist.
Where authentic documents do not become available, interviews with persons,
who may have relevant knowledge and experience, may be another way of
obtaining evidence.
UNMOVIC has names of such persons in its records and they are among the
people whom we seek to interview. In the last month, Iraq has provided us with
the names of many persons, who may be relevant sources of information, in
particular, persons who took part in various phases of the unilateral
destruction of biological and chemical weapons, and proscribed missiles in
1991.
The provision of names prompts two reflections: The first is that with such
detailed information existing regarding those who took part in the unilateral
destruction, surely there must also remain records regarding the quantities and
other data concerning the various items destroyed.
The second reflection is that with relevant witnesses available it becomes
even more important to be able to conduct interviews in modes and locations,
which allow us to be confident that the testimony is given without outside
influence.
While the Iraqi side seems to have encouraged interviewees not to request the
presence of Iraqi officials (so-called minders) or the taping of the interviews,
conditions ensuring the absence of undue influences are difficult to attain
inside Iraq.
Interviews outside the country might provide such assurance. It is our
intention to request such interviews shortly.
Nevertheless, despite remaining shortcomings, interviews are useful.
Since we started requesting interviews, 38 individuals were asked for private
interviews, of which 10 accepted under our terms, seven of these during the
last week.
As I noted on 14 February, intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons
of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks and, in particular, that
there are mobile production units for biological weapons.
The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist. Several inspections
have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile
production facilities.
Food testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as
well as large containers with seed processing equipment. No evidence of
proscribed activities have so far been found. Iraq is expected to assist in the
development of credible ways to conduct random checks of ground transportation.
Inspectors are also engaged in examining Iraq's programme for Remotely
Piloted Vehicles (RPVs). A number of sites have been inspected with data being
collected to assess the range and other capabilities of the various models found.
Inspections are continuing in this area.
There have been reports, denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed
activities are conducted underground. Iraq should provide information on any
underground structure suitable for the production or storage of WMD.
During inspections of declared or undeclared facilities, inspection teams
have examined building structures for any possible underground facilities.
In addition, ground penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific
locations. No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or
storage were found so far.
I should add that, both for the monitoring of ground transportation and for
the inspection of underground facilities, we would need to increase our staff
in Iraq.
I am not talking about a doubling of the staff. I would rather have twice the
amount of high quality information about sites to inspect than twice the number
of expert inspectors to send.
Part 3: Recent developments:
On 14 February, I reported to the Council that the Iraqi side had become
more active in taking and proposing steps, which potentially might shed new
light on unresolved disarmament issues.
Even a week ago, when the current quarterly report was finalised, there was
still relatively little tangible progress to note. Hence, the cautious
formulations in the report before you.
As of today, there is more. While during our meetings in Baghdad, the Iraqi
side tried to persuade us that the Al Samoud 2 missiles they have declared fall
within the permissible range set by the Security Council, the calculations of
an international panel of experts led us to the opposite conclusion.
Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and associated items be destroyed
and has started the process of destruction under our supervision. The
destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament -
indeed, the first since the middle of the 1990s.
We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being
destroyed. However, I must add that no destruction has happened today. I hope
it's a temporary break.
Part 4: Al Samoud missiles:
To date, 34 Al Samoud 2 missiles, including four training missiles, two
combat warheads, one launcher and five engines have been destroyed under
Unmovic supervision.
Work is continuing to identify and inventory the parts and equipment
associated with the Al Samoud 2 programme. Two "reconstituted" casting
chambers used in the production of solid propellant missiles have been destroyed
and the remnants melted or encased in concrete.
The legality of the Al Fatah missile is still under review, pending further
investigation and measurement of various parameters of that missile. More papers
on anthrax, VX and missiles have recently been provided.
Many have been found to restate what Iraq had already declared, some will
require further study and discussion.
There is a significant Iraqi effort underway to clarify a major source of
uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons, which were
unilaterally destroyed in 1991.
A part of this effort concerns a disposal site, which was deemed too
dangerous for full investigation in the past. It is now being re-excavated.
To date, Iraq has unearthed eight complete bombs comprising two liquid-filled
intact R-400 bombs and six other complete bombs. Bomb fragments were also
found. Samples have been taken.
The investigation of the destruction site could, in the best case, allow the
determination of the number of bombs destroyed at that site.
It should be followed by a serious and credible effort to determine the
separate issue of how many R-400 type bombs were produced. In this, as in other
matters, inspection work is moving on and may yield results.
Iraq proposed an investigation using advanced technology to quantify the
amount of unilaterally destroyed anthrax dumped at a site.
However, even if the use of advanced technology could quantify the amount of
anthrax, said to be dumped at the site, the results would still be open to
interpretation.
Defining the quantity of anthrax destroyed must, of course, be followed by
efforts to establish what quantity was actually produced.
With respect to VX, Iraq has recently suggested a similar method to quantify
a VX precursor stated to have been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of
1991.
Iraq has also recently informed us that, following the adoption of the
presidential decree prohibiting private individuals and mixed companies from
engaging in work related to WMD, further legislation on the subject is to be
enacted.
This appears to be in response to a letter from Unmovic requesting
clarification of the issue. What are we to make of these activities? One can
hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant
cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi
side since the end of January.
This is welcome, but the value of these measures must be soberly judged by
how many question marks they actually succeed in straightening out. This is
not yet clear.
Against this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated
immediately, unconditionally and actively - with Unmovic, as required under
paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002).
The answers can be seen from the factual descriptions I have provided.
However, if more direct answers are desired, I would say the following: The
Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding
helicopters and U-2 planes.
Iraq has not, however, so far persisted in these or other conditions for
the exercise of any of our inspection rights. If it did, we would report it.
It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by
the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament
issues, can be seen as "active", or even "proactive", these
initiatives three to four months into the new resolution cannot be said to
constitute "immediate" cooperation.
Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless
welcome and Unmovic is responding to them in the hope of solving presently
unresolved disarmament issues.
Other resolutions:
Mr President, Members of the council may relate most of what I have said to
resolution 1441 (2002), but UNMOVIC is performing work under several resolutions
of the Security Council.
The quarterly report before you is submitted in accordance with resolution
1284 (1999), which not only created UNMOVIC but also continues to guide much
of our work.
Under the time lines set by the resolution, the results of some of this work
is to be reported to the council before the end of this month. Let me be more
specific.
Resolution 1284 (1999) instructs UNMOVIC to "address unresolved
disarmament issues" and to identify "key remaining disarmament
tasks" and the latter are to be submitted for approval by the council in
the context of a work programme.
UNMOVIC will be ready to submit a draft work programme this month as
required.
UNSCOM and the Amorim Panel did valuable work to identify the disarmament
issues, which were still open at the end of 1998.
UNMOVIC has used this material as starting points but analysed the data
behind it and data and documents post 1998 up to the present time to compile
its own list of "unresolved disarmament issues" or, rather, clustered
issues.
It is the answers to these issues which we seek through our inspection
activities.
It is from the list of these clustered issues that UNMOVIC will identify the
"key remaining disarmament tasks". As noted in the report before you,
this list of clustered issues is ready.
UNMOVIC is only required to submit the work programme with the "key
remaining disarmament tasks" to the council. As I understand that several
council members are interested in the working document with the complete
clusters of disarmament issues, we have declassified it and are ready to make
it available to members of the council on request.
In this working document, which may still be adjusted in the light of new
information, members will get a more up-to-date review of the outstanding
issues than in the documents of 1999, which members usually refer to.
Each cluster in the working document ends with a number of points indicating
what Iraq could do to solve the issue. Hence, Iraq's co-operation could be
measured against the successful resolution of issues.
I should note that the working document contains much information and
discussion about the issues which existed at the end of 1998 - including
information which has come to light after 1998.
It contains much less information and discussion about the period after
1998, primarily because of paucity of information. Nevertheless, intelligence
agencies have expressed the view that proscribe programmes have continued or
restarted in this period.
It is further contended that proscribed programmes and items are located in
underground facilities, as I mentioned, and that proscribed items are being
moved around Iraq.
The working document contains some suggestions on how these concerns may be
tackled.
Mr President, Let me conclude by telling you that UNMOVIC is currently
drafting the work programme, which resolution 1284 (1999) requires us to submit
this month.
It will obviously contain our proposed list of key remaining disarmament
tasks; it will describe the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and
verification that the council has asked us to implement; it will also describe
the various subsystems which constitute the programme, eg for aerial
surveillance, for information from governments and suppliers, for sampling, for the checking of road traffic, etc.
How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament
tasks?
While co-operation can and is to be immediate, disarmament and at any rate
the verification of it cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude,
induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify
sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and draw
conclusions.
It would not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither governments nor
inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever.
However, it must be remembered that in accordance with the governing
resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place
after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm, if signs
were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programmes.
NOTICE: Some pages with information the War on Iraq, have content directly
quoted from the Bush White House website prior to the War on Iraq, and early into the war(2003). USResolve.org
does not endorse the information provided by the White House website, it remains here ONLY as an
historical record.
this file not directly accessible
